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My goal  in this lecture is  to  regroup some widely understood
characteristics of the closing decades of the Twentieth Century and to
view them from an unfamiliar but ancient perspective.  The introductory
theme  is  that land still matters.  But it matters in new ways, and with
shifting degrees  of intensity.  The  task of the land economist is  to trace
out  these shifts, appraise them, and relate them to the larger social and
cultural setting in which they occur.  The goal  is  to  improve our
perception of the consequences of our actions and of the implicit policies
and values  that drive  them.
A point of departure  in pursuing this goal  is  to recognize that land
economics  is about power,  its distribution and the institutions that
govern its exercise.  It follows  that land economics  is about people, for
it  is  individuals acting alone, and through group action, that define
land, give  it value, and alter  its use.  It  is fitting  to open this
discussion by recalling the words of Leonard Salter, a close friend of Ray
Penn's, who warned us a half-century ago against "a tendency to
Raymond J. Penn Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the Office of
International Studies and Programs, the Department of Agricultural
Economics and the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
October 6, 1988.
Professor Emeritus,  Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota, St.  Paul.  Without  implying any
endorsement of the outcome, I am indebted to  a number of individuals for
data, suggestions, criticism, or encouragement, including especially John
Adams, Dennis Ahlburg, Jean Kinsey,  Ford Runge, James Vaupel, and Gene
Wunderlich.concentrate attention on the area which is  our laboratory rather than on
the human relations which are our subject matter, and the development of
those relations which are our problems"  (quoted in Musbach and Johnson,
1941, p. 492.)
The  focus of the discussion that follows is on major trends  in the
past half-century that have altered the role played by land in the
American economy.  After a  brief look at the evolving significance of
agricultural land, attention will shift to the non-farm component in
contemporary land problems which is  where this generation is recording its
greatest impact.  At the end of the First World War, the population of  the
United States was almost exactly half urban, half rural, and 30.6 percent
lived on farms.  Sixty years later, in 1988,  the nation was 74 percent
urban and only 2.0 percent lived on farms (USDA, 1973;  Population
Reference Bureau, 1988).  This demographic  fact dominates our economic and
cultural life, and not least our attitudes toward land and our demands
upon it.
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL LAND USE
In dollar value of products and services, agriculture is  the dominant
use  of America's land.  In acre terms, however, the 469 million acres of
cropland enumerated in 1982 were only 20.7 percent of the total land area
of 2,265 million acres for the 50  states.  Grassland pasture and range
comprised 597 million acres, or 26.3 percent, and forest land made up 655
million acres or  28.9 percent.  The remaining 24 percent or  544 million
acres  included lands in transportation or recreation uses, urban areas,
2other special uses,  and marsh, swamp,  desert and waste lands  (Frey and
Hexem, 1985).
Cropland planted or in summer fallow, in peak years, has  rarely
exceeded 80 percent of the area classified as  cropland.  In 1981 the  387
million planted or  fallowed acres were 82.5 percent of total cropland
acres.  This can be regarded as  the historical peak in national cropland
capacity utilization.
A more  interesting trend involves the acreage of cropland actually
harvested.  For the ten years, 1976-1985, harvested cropland averaged 334
million acres, slightly below the annual average of 336 million acres
harvested in the ten years, 1911-1920.  Since 1910,  the maximum acreage
harvested was  361 million acres in 1932  and the minimum was 286 million
acres  in 1969.  With 1977 used as a base of 100,  the index of total
cropland acres used for crops was never above  102 and never below 87  in
the 75  years from 1910 through 1984  (Frey and Hexem, 1985, pp.  26-27).
The remarkable nature of this relative stability is apparent if we
remember that  in this period corn production increased 2.7  times, wheat
2.95 times,  and over 60 million acres were diverted to  soybeans,  a crop
that was not even reported officially until 1924  (Raup, 1987A).
In this period, some cropland was abandoned, more was cleared,
drained, and irrigated, and we began seriously to practice multiple
cropping, primarily with wheat and soybeans in the Delta states and the
Southeast.  The brute fact remains:  All of  the  increase in U.S.
agricultural output in the past 75 years was achieved without any net
increase  in the area of harvested cropland.  This parallels the experience
in Western Europe since  the end of the Second World War, where
3agricultural output has roughly doubled, and the area of cropped land has
actually declined.  Since 1960/61, for example, wheat production doubled
in the 12  countries now forming the  EEC while the wheat area dropped 14
percent  (USDA, 1987A, p. 20).
It is  simplistic  to conclude that land as a food base  is of
diminished importance.  But it must be concluded that historic  concerns
about running out of land are misdirected.  Our ability to maintain the
flow of intellectual capital  is  the true substitute for  land.  This key to
the preservation of the productive capacity of agricultural land is
threatened by many defects  in our institutional structure.  One  of the
most threatening  is a search for stability that has substituted rigidity
for resiliency and robbed us of shock-absorbing capacity.  This  trend is
the outgrowth of our attempts  to avoid risk.
III.  THE RISKS OF RISK REDUCTION
One of the legacies of  the depression of the 1930's  in the U.S. has
been the  transfer of risk from individuals to the state.  This takes many
forms, and only a few can be discussed here.
The evidence  is clear that government-supported guarantees  of bank
and savings and loan deposits have fostered careless lending.  With fear
of a "run on the bank" removed, lending officials have  taken risks  they
would never take if loss of depositor confidence were still a constraint.
In savings and loan associations, this reduction of risk fed directly
through the credit system into  the real estate market, first for housing
and more recently for commercial real estate lending.  The effect was
accelerated by tax reforms after  1980.
4A similar process has been at work in farming.  Commodity price
supports dating from the 1930's removed one element of risk involved in
farm production decisions.  As a result,  farmers  took on more debt to
expand, and embraced monoculture on a scale  that they would not dare  if
the threat of product price collapse were real.
Social Security has resulted in a parallel response  in household
finance.  The pressure on individuals to  save for health reverses  or for
old age has been reduced.  They can risk spending up to  or beyond levels
justified by current income, with the result that consumption expenditure
takes precedence over savings and investment.
In each of these cases risk has been transferred from individuals to
the state, which means to individuals  as taxpayers.  Risk,  in short, has
been socialized.  One consequence is  that the magnitude of risk is
obscured and is more difficult to  calculate.  A false sense of confidence
has been established, and when reverses do come  their psychological  impact
is severe.  Adjustments to change  are best made at  frequent intervals,  in
small steps.  The socialization of risk raises  the possibility that small
corrections will be postponed until  the need reaches crisis proportions.
Change, and its  twin sister risk, are  facts of life.  The transfer or
postponement of risk is not equivalent  to  its elimination.  If risk cannot
be appraised accurately by individuals, and is transferred to  the  state,
then a greater intrusion by the state  into the economic decisions  of
individuals  is  inevitable.  The danger  is that the machinery of state will
be unable to  evaluate risk, or to  act promptly upon evaluation, and that
exposure to  risk will simply accumulate until there  is  an explosion.
5The implication of this danger for land use is  that the suppression
of risk has fostered over-lending and over-building in commercial and
residential real estate, and over-expansion  in agriculture.  The risk that
has been removed or disguised in profit-and-loss calculations has been
capitalized into the value of land and structures, both by businesses and
households.  As a result, contemporary U.S.  real estate contains an
element of fictitious value.  This must eventually be squeezed out, and
the process is well under way but far from completion.  The collapse of
farm land values after 1981 was  the  first major readjustment.  The current
difficulties of banks and savings and loan associations  in Texas  and
California continue the process.  More is  to come.
This process  of revaluing real estate to acknowledge real risk will
affect the speed and extent of urban expansion, and the pace of housing
construction and farm recapitalization.  The  effect on rural non-farm
lands  is likely to be especially sharp.  One of the most powerful demands
in an affluent society  is  for space.  Congestion is  one of  the negative
dimensions of urban life that  is most difficult to  tolerate.  Attempts to
escape urban congestion have been driving forces in the use of land around
urban-industrial centers, and often in more remote rural and forested
regions.  This demand for a rural life style has been fostered by easy
credit and a defective evaluation of risk.  The corrective process will
dampen this demand for non-farm residential and recreational uses  of rural
lands.  It is unlikely to stop  it, for reasons explored in the next
section.
6IV.  THE SEPARATION AND RECOMBINATION OF HOME AND WORKPLACE
The separation of where people  live from where they earn their living
is one of the great transitional milestones in human history.  The social
fabric  in developed industrial economies  is  still infused with behavior
rules, social norms, and prescriptions for problem solutions  that reflect
a presumed coincidence of the residence and the workplace.
The industrial city involved a break in this  connection.  The growth
of industrial labor forces in the 18th and 19th centuries required massive
rural  to urban migration, and the new migrants  rarely owned their own
homes.  It had been presumed for two centuries  that industrial workers did
not have the mind-set that is characteristic of owners of landed property.
In the Marxist creed, this presumption was incorporated into the
definition of the working class:  they were not property owners.  The hall-
mark of the early industrial era was  the separation of home and workplace.
A more recent step in the evolution of urban-industrial  life has been
the shift from rental to  owner-occupied housing.  The  typical worker or
employee in the U.S.  today does not  own tools nor have an ownership
interest  in the product or  service produced, but home-ownership is  the
norm.  In 1890,  the home ownership rate among all households was 47.8
percent.  This fell  to 45.6 percent  in 1920, rose  to  48 percent in 1930,
and fell again to  45.7 percent in 1940.  The rise after 1940 was almost
without interruption (Carliner, 1972, p. 116).  By 1980, 65.6 percent of
U.S. households lived in owner-occupied homes.  This percentage slipped
slightly in 1985, but with the entry of the baby-boom generation into the
high ownership years, "the overall ownership rate will inexorably rise
towards 70 percent or higher"  (Diamond,  1986).
7A perspective on the significance of data on home ownership
participation rates  is provided by estimates derived from census  data of
the total number of land owners  in the United states.  Wunderlich has
estimated that there were in the mid-1970's a minimum of 60 million owners
of land of all types, with the estimate ranging up to  77 million under
alternative assumptions and definitions of ownership  (Wunderlich, 1978, p.
8;  Lewis,  1980, p. 38).
The New York Stock Exchange estimated in 1980  that the all-time peak
in the number of individuals  owning common stock in the U.S. was
30,850,000 in 1970.  This declined to 25.2 million in 1975 and rose again
to  29.8 million in 1980, with a median portfolio value  in 1980 of $4,000
(New  York Times. Dec.  9. 1980. D. 14).  The increased role of mutual
funds,  institutional investors,  and foreign investors since 1980 has made
it difficult to  derive subsequent estimates of stockholder participation
but the number of individuals  owning common stocks has almost surely
declined.
Using the most conservative estimates,  the number of  individuals
owning land in the United States  is  at least twice as  great as  the peak
number of individuals  ever owning common stocks.  A more probable estimate
is  that, after the stock market collapse of October  1987,  individuals
owning land outnumbered individual owners of common stocks by three  to
one,  or more.  To the extent that the United States can be characterized
as a democracy of property owners,  it  is real property and not stocks that
dominates  their property holdings.  The  fact that 64 percent of all
households owned their own home in 1986  is  remarkable, in view of  the
dilution in the definition of a "household" resulting from the rise of
8single-person households since 1950. The current estimate is  that
residential property constitutes from 60 to  70  percent of the net worth of
all U.S. households  (Salvigsen,  1988).  Home ownership has become the
major  instrument for saving and investment by households, and this role  is
increasing.
As of The Census of Agriculture in 1982,  farm operators who owned all
or a part of the land they farmed controlled 88.5 percent of the  total
area of land in farms.  Only 11.5 percent of farmland was operated by
tenants farming only land rented from others.  In 1974, 1978, and 1982
this  percentage was the  lowest ever reported since statistics were first
collected on farm tenancy in 1880 (Raup, 1987, pp.  274).
These data lend strength to a conclusion that a definitive
characteristic of the American version of urban-industrial society in the
closing decades of the 20th century is  a dedication to the acquisition,
maintenance and protection of ownership rights in farm and residential
property.  Land economics up to  the Second World War was preoccupied with
problems  involving ownership, use, and control of agricultural land.
Beginning in the 1920's and accelerating after  the Second World War, the
problem focus shifted to urban lands.  Although there are no historical
time series reporting the extent of land ownership in the United States
before about 1880, the data we do have suggest that the proportion of the
U.S. population with ownership rights in urban or rural land is currently
at an all-time peak.
The ultimate expression of this demand for  land in an urban-
industrial culture has been the move  to the suburbs, and beyond.  This
expression of the demand for residential space has been heavily weighted
9with an associated demand for water areas, and for forests, or at least
woodlands.  Our cities exploded, and the value of land as  landscape
appreciated.
An inventory of the area that can be classified as  "urban" is not an
adequate measure of the resultant shift of rural land to  urban uses.  In
terms of acres, the big impact of urbanization on land use is  through  the
conversion of agricultural and forest land to rural  residential or
recreational use,  at densities of settlement so low that the land is
unlikely to be classified as "urban" for many years,  if ever.  We now have
a growing category of land use  that is  "non-farm" but also  "non-urban."
This  is  associated with profound changes  in both the  time dimensions and
the space dimensions of work.
Historically, and in most occupations, when a person worked has been
intimately related to where the person worked and lived.  The concept of a
"factory" or an "office"  required the concentration of labor and
materials, enabling continuous production runs, and minimizing transport
time.  This  dictated a clustering of land around the factory or  office
site, and created the commuting belt as  the determinant of the spread and
shape of cities.
This  tie between when work is  done  - the  temporal dimension - and
where  it  is done  - the spatial dimension - is now being relaxed.  The
revolution in communications and continued advances  in transport permit
greater decentralization of many types of productive activities.  This
enables residential amenities  to play a larger role in determining where a
labor  force will live.
10At the same  time, the range of choices of when to work has been
enlarged.  Stereotyped concepts of the work day and the work week are
being altered.  Work in many professions and services can increasingly be
done at a time most convenient for the worker, and at a location of the
worker's choice.  These changes alter fundamentally the determinants of
rural  land use, both farm and forest.  They have already eroded the
boundaries of cities, and have  introduced demands for urban services  into
areas once considered distinctly rural.
Two streams  in this  transitional growth in rural residential land use
are converging.  One  is  the continuing expansion of the demand for second
homes for seasonal use.  The other  is  the accelerating demand for second
homes for uses that compete with or even supplant the uses of the primary
residence.  In past usage, the term second home was largely a misnomer.
They were not really homes, but safety-valves or escape hatches, to
meliorate the congestion and frustration of city life or industrial jobs.
Their distinguishing characteristic was a focus on leisure.  What is
relatively new in rural non-farm land uses  is  the shift from seasonal use
to more nearly year-around use with an associated demand for year-around
urban levels of services.
An even more recent development  is  the appearance of rural  residences
that really are second homes and whose location has been selected with
both work and leisure in mind.  This was always a feature of the "stock-
broker" or  "banker" belts around large financial centers, notably New York
and Chicago  in the U.S.,  and London, Paris, Zurich,  or Geneva, in Europe.
This pattern is now expanding to  include more than an occupational group
with favorable working hours.  The modern two-home owner can increasingly
11elect to work at home.  An urban residence becomes a convenience but not a
necessity, even for those with  "urban" jobs.
This  transition in residential choice is  accelerated by the growth of
the service economy.  The combination of a residence and a place of
employment is  increasingly feasible for many types  of professional work.
The computer age promises to  expand this possibility.  The  "office in the
home" introduces  an increasing element of choice in where to  live, where
to work and when to work.  By recombining the home and the workplace,  the
computer age and the information revolution create demands for
residential land in areas once thought to lie outside conventional urban
commuting belts.
This greatly expands the potential for urban sprawl.  Recent evidence
from England suggests that the second-home commuting belt around London,
once defined by two hours of travel  time,  is now expanding to include
regions reachable with three hours of travel  (The Economist, Aug. 13,
1988, p. 51).  By this  standard, major areas of rural farm and forested
America would be  included in the residential belts  of our principal
cities.  By redefining work the revolutions  in information and
communications are redefining cities.  This promises to be  the dominant
fact governing the role of the land economist in the 21st century.  (Raup,
1988).
V.  WASTE DISPOSAL AS A LAND USE TYPE
Among the  types of land use  that have escalated in importance with
growing urbanization are toxic and hazardous waste disposal  sites.
Although sewage and garbage disposal problems are as  old as civilization,
12they have acquired new dimensions in the past half-century.  While  the
industrial era that began in the  1880's was inducted as the age of steel,
the century ending in the 1980's marks the triumph of the age of
chemistry.  One consequence is  the generation of waste materials that,
both in quantity and degree of toxicity, are unlike any wastes in the
past.
Add to this the more easily dramatized but less ubiquitous problems
of nuclear waste disposal and the result is a witches' brew of land use
problems that date primarily from the Second World War.  In an exhaustive
enumeration of land use problems  in the  1930's,  the report of a task force
on land classification to the National Resources Planning Board did not
even list sites for waste disposal as a category of land use (National
Resources Planning Board, 1941).
The situation is dramatically reversed today.  Measured in terms of
public awareness and citizen arousal, the search for waste disposal sites
would probably rank at  the top of any current list of intractable land use
problems facing public authorities.
This problem set is peculiarly relevant  to  farm and ranch lands,  and
to  forestry, since remoteness  is perhaps  the single most important
attribute of a potential site for hazardous waste disposal.  Almost by
definition, the more remote the  site the  less  is  likely to be known about
soil and groundwater conditions, or about the ecological consequences of
specific  types of toxicity, and the fewer outraged property owners  there
will be to object.
We can predict with virtual certainty that land economists in the
future will be drawn into the controversy over waste disposal sites.  In
13addition to being the unpaid landscape gardeners for an urban populations'
aesthetic consumption of rural space, farmers,  ranchers, and foresters  in
the future will be prominent among the custodians of an urban culture's
preferred solution to the NIMBY problem - Not In My Backyard.  A future
focus on land classification in terms of suitability for waste disposal
seems assured, as an addition to the  items to be  included in the concept
of multiple rural land use.
VI.  A CLOSER LOOK AT THE MARKET FOR URBAN LAND
Of all of the markets that have been distorted in the U.S. by the
phenomenal baby-boom, none has long-run consequences to match those in the
housing market.  With over 4 million births annually from 1954  through
1964, we are now just entering the era of peak housing demand.  The
percentage of the population in the under-25  age group peaked in 1974, the
age  group 25-34 peaked in 1986,  and the  age group 35-44 will peak in about
1995.  The years from 1985  to  2000 will bridge an era of peak demand for
housing that has no parallel, in terms of the increase from the decade of
the  1970's and the potential decline in demand after about 2000.  The
resolution of this  demand will shape our housing stock, and our cities,
far into the 21st century.
The current problem is  one of providing housing that will satisfy
entry-level demand, and trading-up demand.  This explains  the recent (and
now fading) popularity of condominiums, and the current concern over
affordable housing.  Demand is outrunning supply, and the most noticeable
consequence is  the pressure on building sites.  Thirty years ago it was
commonplace for a building lot to comprise  7 to  15 percent of the final
14cost of a single-family house.  This rose to the  10 to 20 percent range by
the 1970's and to the 15  to  30  percent range in the  1980's.  It  is no
longer remarkable in high-amenity or high-growth areas for a building site
to approach and exceed 40 percent of the  final cost of a single family
home.  The relative price of urban land is rising.
The result of smaller households, higher land costs, and a peak
demand for entry-level housing has been to  generate a stock of relatively
small-scale housing units.  These have been built at density levels that
are tolerable for childless couples, or families with small children, but
are quickly outgrown as children age.
This  is  the current situation, and the origin of rising concern about
the mis-match of housing demand and supply.  The question of affordable
housing focuses this concern on the segment of the market that is
characterized by brokers as  the sector covering the transition from
"start-up" buyers to  "trade-up" buyers.  The  initial surge of baby-boom
demand generated a response  in the form of housing that was suitable  for
start-up or first  time buyers.  This,  in turn, was followed by a drop  in
demand that was  as dramatic  in its decline as was  the original explosive
rise.  From the peak of births of 4,308,000 in 1957  the  drop was  to
3,137,000 births in 1973,  or a decline of 27.2 percent in 16 years.  This
means  that the peak population of those  30 years old occurred in 1987,  and
their numbers drop rapidly after  1990.
From peak to  trough, and assuming stable economic conditions, there
will be a drop of at least one-fourth by the end of the 1990's  in the
number of replacement buyers who can buy the start-up homes of the
households  that are  ready to  trade-up.  The resultant downward pressure on
15the resale market prices of smaller start-up homes erodes  the equity of
the peak baby-boomers, who are ready to trade up.  They can find
themselves stuck in the housing market queue.
The depth of this baby-boom trap in the housing market is made worse
if the prospective trade-up buyers face a shortage of vacancies  in the
home-size or location classes to which they aspire, and a shortage of
buyers for their start-up homes.  The sharply cyclical nature of the baby
boom guarantees a period in which the demand for trade-up housing drives
up the price of the available stock, and the excess  supply of entry-level
housing drives down the prices of this class of residences.  We are now
entering this period.
A simulation study of the potential effects of this one-time bulge  in
housing demand has shown that, under the worst-case scenario of no buyer
for your house and no place  to move, those stuck  in  the housing market
could equal half of all start-up households over the course of  a decade,
with the worst shortages of trade-up homes occurring after 1994.  Under
more likely assumptions of inter-regional mobility and some supply
response in the form of new construction of trade-up level housing, the
major cause of being stuck becomes  the lack of buyers for starter homes.
This could affect one-third of the starter households over the decade used
in the simulation (Peacock, 1988).
This underlines the potential for extreme volatility in the housing
market.  A variant of this theme  is provided by a brief look at the
prospects at  the exit instead of  the entry level of the market.  Recent
warnings of a prospective fall in housing prices have multiplied, and
increased in stridency (Barrons, August 22,  1988).  This could be
16especially costly for the elderly.  Individuals born in the period from
1915  to  1920 will exhaust their actuarial life expectancy of 75 years  in
the period from 1990 to  1995.  They were  the age class  that graduated from
high school in the depths of the  depression of the 1930's.  If they have
succeeded in acquiring some equity in housing over the intervening years,
a fall  in housing prices could pitch them into a second depression at the
stage  in their life  cycle at which they should begin to disinvest  in
housing.  The  search for security and the postponement of risk, discussed
in section III  above, has unquestionably created an artificial element of
value  in land, and not least in residential land.  It will be ironic if
the process of wringing out this  excess value falls with particular force
upon the generation that bore the brunt of missed or postponed
opportunities in the  1930's  and provided the support base  in human capital
during the Second World War.
VII.  INTERNATIONAL LAND USE POLICIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FOOD SECURITY
To this  point the  discussion has  centered on the redefinition of land
problems  that is  occurring in the United States, and in similarly
urbanized and industrialized economies.  In the jargon of development
economics,  these highly developed and industrialized countries  are grouped
together as  the OECD countries,  including Western Europe, Canada, the
United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.  This grouping glosses
over one crucial distinction:  Are they food surplus producer, or must they
depend on food imports?
The relevance of the  question arises  from the  fact that  the OECD
group  includes both the largest food exporters  in the world, and the
17largest food importers.  This groups of countries dominates world trade  in
agricultural products.  Disputes among them over  trade policies have
provided the raw material for international trade negotiations for  the
past half-century.  Since the Second World War, these negotiations have
been conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, or GATT.  Seven rounds of negotiations have had some success in
lowering trade barriers, and the eighth or "Uruguay Round"  is now taking
place.
Unlike previous rounds,  the subject of trade barriers  that protect
agriculture has been placed squarely on the agenda of the Uruguay round.
This  raises a host of problems that are beyond the scope of this
discussion, but one problem in particular has the explosive potential to
dominate all others.  This  is  the inclusion in the agenda, strongly
supported by the United States, of a stated goal of removing all  internal
subsidies  to agriculture  that prevent world market prices  from guiding
domestic land use decisions  in the member countries.
Although the United States has many subsidy program in agriculture
that depend on the exclusion of imports,  the major targets of attempts to
remove agricultural subsidies are the European Economic Community  (EEC),
and Japan -- the EEC because it exports  too much and Japan because  it
imports too little.  High internal prices  in the EEC have stimulated
agricultural production so  successfully that the resulting surpluses can
only be disposed of by subsidizing their export at  the expense  of other
exporting countries.  Japanese  agricultural prices have been supported at
levels  so far above world market prices  that agricultural  land prices play
18a major role  in driving up urban land prices and distorting urban growth
patterns.
Remove these subsidies,  the argument runs,  and trade will lead to
more rational land use decisions.  The economic arguments  in support of
this position are overwhelming, but they confront a disturbing political
reality:  Demagogic leaders in Germany and Japan were able  to lead their
countries into the Second World War by playing on fears of land shortages
and food scarcities.
The admittedly uneconomic levels of agricultural prices in the EEC
and Japan have so  stimulated domestic production that no contemporary
political leader can raise a realistic specter of food shortages.
Removing the subsidies  that have generated this uneconomic production
could lay a foundation on which a new generation of demagogic leaders
could rekindle xenophobic fears.
It is  difficult for Americans to appreciate the explosive political
potential that can be created by a fear of running out of food.  Boston
experienced this briefly during the truckers'  strike, and Los Angeles
contemplated the prospect of food riots during the OPEC embargo, but these
experiences were quickly forgotten.
In judging the cost of subsidized protection for agriculture in
densely populated countries or regions, the economic costs cannot be
offset by the economic benefits  of freer trade,  if a potential for  food
dependency is  the result.  Some minimum levels  of self-sufficiency in food
may well be the prerequisite for political  stability in an urbanized
world.  Representatives of the United States should keep  this clearly in
mind in negotiations in the Uruguay round.  The rational use and control
19of a nation's land depends on calculations of risk that transcend economic
theory.  This  lesson from two World Wars should not be  forgotten.
VIII.  A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE LIFE CYCLES OF
CORPORATIONS, FARMS, AND INSTITUTIONS
IN THE MIDDLE WEST
In the  life cycle of business corporations, many are now passing into
the hands of the third or fourth generation of owners.  The grandchildren
and great grandchildren have little direct tie  to the original founders
and owners.  Many of them have other things  they want to do with the money
value of their stock, and want out.  They are ripe for takeover bids.
This  is  a major part of the explanation for the current wave of mercers,
sell-offs and buy-outs.
Something like this  is also happening in the Midwestern rural
economy.  Pioneering great-grandparents may have been romantic characters
but their grip on their great-grandchildren is weakening.  Current heirs
are likely to  sell out if a good opportunity arises.  The consolidation of
corporations  thus has a parallel in the consolidation of farms.  Both
trends  in the Middle West are a reflection of the speed with which the
region from  the Ohio-Pennsylvania border to  the Rocky Mountains was
settled.
The structure of private and public institutions  in this region was
largely put in place in about 75 years, from 1815  to  1890.  State and
local units of government, school districts,  postal routes,  railroads and
road systems, church congregations, bank service territories, and many
more forms of the  institutional infrastructure date from this  era.  The
closing of the frontier meant to  Frederick Jackson Turner the
20disappearance of free land and the blocking in of unsettled territories.
It was also a closing of a frontier of institution-building.
The creation of the basic institutional structure of the Middle West
within the  life span of an individual meant that these institutions would
age at about the  same rate.  They went up together, and they are growing
old together.  This gives a cyclical character to many of the problems of
institutional reform and adjustment  in the Middle West.  The region is
certainly not homogenous, but  it  is united by the scope of its
institutional history to a degree that sets  it  apart from the rest  of the
United States.
This  is  especially true  of the institutional structure supporting
land tenure and land uses.  It was created to reflect  the era of
railroads, not the era of superhighways and jet air  transport.  It was
designed to serve  sectors focused on the production of goods,  in an era in
which the rural population was overwhelmingly engaged in farming,
forestry, or mining.
Today the rural population is predominantly non-farm, and the demands
on local institutions by rural land users  are primarily urban in
character.  Land in this  region is  increasingly being managed under
decision rules  that reflect a primary status as a producer of services as
well as of goods.
A new land classification  is needed, setting out  those areas  in which
the major land uses serve residential, recreational, and amenity goals.
These  are associated with a need for reform in the social, political, and
economic  structures of communities  to  support the massive decentralization
of cities  that is now technically possible.  The most rapidly expanding
challenge  to  the land economist in the 21st century seems likely to be
21primarily in the study of land as a producer of services, and only
secondarily in its  role as a producer of commodities.
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